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IIL REFERENCES AND CITATIONS 
References and citations in this brief shall have the following abbreviations: 
The record of court's file on appeal - AR (Appellate Record) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - URCP, and 
Utah Code Annotated- UCA 
Exhibits —Ex 
Citations to the record will be (AR ) 
IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS TO HEAR THIS APPEAL 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal transferred to it by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to its transfer authority in Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-2(2)(j). 
V. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS FOR REVIEW 
AND CITATIONS TO RECORD OF PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion of the defendant, Wardley 
Corporation, (hereinafter Wardley) for summary judgment dismissing the claim of the 
plaintiff, Cindy L. Young, (hereinafter Young) for breach of contract for the failure to pay her 
commissions on $166,000 earned but not paid by the seller, Robert Highsmith, for the sale 
of the Chateau Brickyard Senior Retirement Apartments in Salt Lake City? On an appeal 
from a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals construes the evidentiary material submitted 
on the motion and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion." Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
App 1993) citing Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1992). The Court 
reviews the district court's legal conclusions for correctness. Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. 
Ross. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing the claim 
of Young against Wardley for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
connection with the sale? On an appeal from a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals 
construes the evidentiary material submitted on the motion and all reasonable inferences to 
be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Equitable Life 
Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App 1993) citing Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
835 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1992). The Court reviews the district court's legal conclusions for 
correctness. Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Ross. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in construing the agency employment contract 
between Wardley and Young to be unambiguous on its face and to provide that Young only 
earned commissions on the $150,000.00 that Wardley was actually paid by the seller and not 
on the contract amount? On appeal the courts review construction of statutes as conclusions 
of law. They accord the trial court no deference on its conclusion. 
VL CONTROLLING STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
A. CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 62-2-18(1) & (2) 
B. CONTROLLING RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) 
VEL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE, THE COURSE OF THE 
PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
This case involves a contract dispute for failure to pay real estate commissions. This 
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appeal has a unique issue because the payment of fees sought were never collected by 
Wardley. Young claims that she earned the full amount of the commission by bringing a 
willing, able and ready buyer to the closing table who paid the seller the full contract sales 
price of $7,900,000.00, but the seller only paid Wardley at the time of closing $150,000.of 
the total of $316,000 commissions due. Young claims Wardley either chose to ignore 
protecting and collecting the remaining $166,000 of the commission or was negligent in not 
doing so. 
Young, as a real estate agent, is precluded by statute from pursuing her claims in court 
against anyone other that the principal broker. Young claims that Wardley, as the principal 
broker and her employer, breached its contract with her and in addition breached its duty to 
her of good faith and fair dealing by failing to safeguard and collect all of the commissions 
while the sales proceeds were in escrow and before disposition of any of those funds. 
Young claims that Wardley also breached the employment contract and its duty to her 
of good faith and fair dealing by failing to take sufficient and required steps necessary after 
the disposition of the funds to recover the balance of the commission through litigation. 
Wardley obtained a default judgment against the seller who turned out to be insolvent, but 
failed to pursue the buyer who had ownership possession of the subject real property and who 
was in collusion with the seller in withholding the major portion of the commissions. Young 
also claims Wardley should have pursued the escrow agent who had a fiduciary duty to 
safeguard those funds until any commission dispute was resolved, or at the very least, 
instructed the escrow agent to hold the proceeds in escrow pending resolution of the dispute. 
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In addition, notwithstanding Wardley did not collect the full commissions due, Young claims 
that Wardley was responsible to pay her the unpaid portion of her commissions under its 
employment contract with her, since she had fully performed her duty and services to 
Wardley under that contract. For failing to do so, Wardley breached its contract with her. 
Finally, Young claims the trial judge incorrectly construed the contract(s) between her 
and Wardley in holding that the contract terms were unambiguous and that she only "earned5' 
her portion of the commissions actually paid to Wardley by the seller. 
The Order of the trial court granting Wardley summary judgment dismissing Young's 
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was granted on March 9,2004 
(AR 534-535). The Order of the trial court granting Wardley summary judgment dismissing 
Young's claim for breach of contract was entered on November 2, 2004. (AR 805-807) 
B(l) STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On July 1, 1996, the purchaser closed the purchase of the Chateau Brickyard 
Retirement Apartments in Salt Lake City, hereinafter "Chateau Apartments", at a sales price 
of $7,900,000.00. (Young Aff, AR 624) Young, representing Wardley as its real estate agent, 
was present at the office of Associated Title Company, the escrow closing agent, at the time. 
The seller was present on the telephone. However, since the closing documents had to be 
delivered to the out of state seller for signatures, the closing was not completed until several 
days later. 
2. The real estate commission rate for the sale was four percent (4%) or the sales 
price and amounted to $316,000.00. (Id ) Young, on behalf of Wardley, entered into a Single 
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Party Listing and Agency Agreement with Robert Highsmith, general partner of the seller, 
Salt Lake Chateau Brickyard Associates, a California Limited PartnersMp,(hereinafter seller) 
on August 16, 1995. That listing agreement set the commission rate and was never revoked 
or amended. (AR 560. of Young Aft AR 622-624 Exhibit B, AR 633-635 ) 
3. In collusion with the purchaser to cut Wardley's real estate commissions, the 
seller instructed the escrow agent to pay Wardley real estate commissions of only 
$150,000.00. The remaining portion of the commissions, $166,000.00, was divided between 
the seller and the buyer. (Young Aff., AR, 626,) 
4. At the time of the closing, Young, on behalf of Wardley, refused the sellers 
demand to reduce the commission, but did not take any action, including judicial action, to 
protect them by preventing the escrow agent from paying the unpaid portion to the seller and 
the buyer. (Id.) 
5. After the sale had closed, Wardley brought suit against the seller for breach of 
contract and obtained a default judgment. However, Wardley learned that the seller was 
financially insolvent and judgment proof and did not take make any further attempts to collect 
the judgment. (Wardley Aff., AR, 153-154 & Exhibit K, AR, 190-195) 
6. Wardley refused to sue the purchaser for interference with contractual relations 
and the escrow agent for breach of a fiduciary duty. (Young Aff., AR 306-309 & Exhibits F, 
G,H,I,J) 
7. Wardley refused to pay Young her share of the earned $166,000 unpaid or 
uncollected portion of the commission. (AR 21, [^18, 135-136, 410-411) 
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8. Young brought the instant litigation in December 1999 based upon her contract 
with Wardley and the Utah Code which requires her to look to her principal broker for her 
commissions and prevents her from pursuing litigation against anyone but the principal broker 
to recover her commissions. (AR 1-17 & UCA § 61-2-18) 
9. After the case had been stalled in discovery for three and one half years, 
Wardley moved for summary judgment arguing that it had performed all that it was 
reasonably required to do and Young's complaint should be dismissed. (AR 141) 
10. The Court denied Wardley's motion to dismiss Young's claim for breach of 
contract but granted in part Wardley's motion by dismissing Young's claim of Wardley's 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (AR 534-535) 
11. Subsequently, Young filed a motion and memorandum seeking partial summary 
judgment that she was entitled to her share of the full earned commissions of $316,000.00. 
(A.R. 556-573) In its response, Wardley renewed its motion for summary judgment for a 
dismissal of Young's claim for breach of contract related to its failure to pay her commission 
on the unpaid or uncollected part ($166,000.00) of the total commissions. 
12. The Court heard and denied Young's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
August 6, 2004.1 (AR 769-771) 
13. The Court ruled on Wardley' s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
1
 During the course of the proceedings on summary judgment, Young amended the 
complaint with leave of the court and raised claims that Wardley failed to pay her all of the 
commission to which she was entitled from the $150,00 actually paid to Wardley. She received a 
jury verdict and a judgment in her favor on that claim on November 17, 2006. 
6 
on November 2, 2006. (AR 800-807) In reaching the ruling, the Court considered only the 
language within the four corners of the employment agreement and held that it imambiguously 
provided that Young "earned" only a percentage of the commission actually paid; in the 
words of the Court, the calculation of commissions is based upon the "actual amount that the 
property yielded and not on an assumed amount." (AR 800) 
14. Young entered into her employment contract with Wardley on April 30, 1992 
styled as a "Broker Sales Executive Contract Independent Contractor Agreement" (AR 400-
404, Exhibit N to Affidavit of Cindy L. Thompson, plaintiff) 
15. Paragraph 7 of Young's employment contract with Wardley, entered into on 
April 30, 1992, provides in pertinent part: 
. . The commissions and fees for services rendered on the sale, rental, 
trade or lease of real estate shall be those set forth on the "Listing Commission 
Schedule", shown on page 3. . . (Id.) 
16. Paragraph 8 of the contract provides in pertinent part: 
. . . Division and payment of commissions, fees and commission bonuses 
shall be in accordance with the Broker's Annual Graduated Commission Schedule 
for Realtors' attached hereto and incorporated herein on page 4. Division and 
distribution of earned commissions shall take place as soon as practical after 
collection of such commissions from the party or parties for whom the services 
have been performed... 
The division of "earned commissions" referred to in that paragraph is between the 
broker and the sales agent(s). (Id) 
17. The Annual Graduated Commission Schedule For Realtors provides in 
pertinent part: In House Crossboard 
Commission Commission 
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Step 5 $50,000 and Above 80%. 66.66% 
"In House Commission"is based upon the Sales Executive listing and selling 
a Wardley Better Homes and Gardens property (both legs of the transaction). 
Sales Executives receive the percentage shown of the total commission received 
by the Broker (Id) 
18.. Young was to be paid her earned commission based upon a graduated scale as 
soon as practical after the collection of the commission from the seller. According to the 
graduated scale, the agent(s) were entitled to eighty percent of the commission earned.2 
B(2) STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
In her Responses to Wardley's motions for summary judgment and partial summary 
judgment, Young disputed the following very basic and material facts. 
19. Wardley claimed that it had paid Young $56,400 commissions on the Chateau 
Brickyard sale and that was all to which she was entitled. 
20. Wardley claimed that it had done all that it could reasonably be expected to do 
to collect and/or recover the remaining balance of the commission due and unpaid which 
amounted to $166,000. This last fact statement has many different subordinate facts that are 
material and which needed to be ferreted out by discovery and presented at trial such as: 
(a) Did Wardley, apart from Cindy Young, object to the seller's unilateral 
changing of the commission amount at closing? 
2
 Young had engaged in an agreement with another agent for Wardley by which that 
agent and Young would split equally the amount of the commissions. A dispute arose in the case 
before trial whether Young was entitled to the full amount of the agent's commission. However, 
that issue is not relevant to this appeal. 
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(b) Did Wardley's officers or brokers do anything or make any demand upon 
Associated Title Company, the escrow agent, to hold the full amount of the 
commissions in escrow until a resolution of the commission dispute was 
resolved? 
(c) Did Wardley consult its legal counsel at the time of the closing about what 
it should do before the sales proceeds were dispersed by Associated Title 
Company? 
(d) What, if any other steps, did Wardley take or fail to take in order to 
safeguard the commission while the sales proceeds were in escrow and after? 
VHL SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing Young's claim for her 
proportionate share of the unpaid real estate commissions upon a construction of the 
Employment Contract between Young and Wardley. The Court erred in holding that ^ 8 of 
the contract limited Young's "earned commissions55 to her proportionate share of the 
commissions which Wardley received at the time of closing. The court below also erred in 
concluding that the definition of "In House Commissions55, on page 4 of the employment 
agreement, limited the earned commissions to Young to be her percentage of the amount of 
commissions actually received by Wardley. 
The meaning the trial court gave those provisions is a strained construction. A plain 
reading of both provisions in context shows that the expressions used were used for different 
purposes than given by the court. The phrase "earned commissions" in paragraph 8 is 
merely used to provide when those commissions are to be paid and not to limit the amount 
of the commissions earned. The definition of "IN HOUSE COMMISSION" merely provides 
how the commissions will be divided when they are received. It does not define or limit the 
amount of those commissions that the agent (in this case Young) has earned. 
B. WARDLEY OWED A CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO SAFEGUARD AND TAKE 
ALL REASONABLE STEPS TO COLLECT AND PAY YOUNG HER SHARE 
OF THE FULL COMMISSIONS 
Wardley owed a contractual duty to Young to safeguard the earned real estate 
commission ($316,000.) while it was in the possession and custody of the escrow agent and 
to take reasonable and adequate steps to collect the full commission after the seller, through 
the escrow agent, spirited away the major portion of those funds, $166,000 by dispersing 
them to the seller and the buyer contrary to the listing agreement that the seller had made with 
Wardley before it even entered into the real estate purchase agreement with the buyer and 
before the closing of the sale took place. Wardley breached this contractual duty to Young 
by not taking diligent steps to prevent the unlawful dispersion of the $166,000 and by later 
not taking reasonable and adequate steps to recover and pay Young her share of the money. 
C. PAYMENT OF COMMISSIONS UNDER THOMPSON'S EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT WITH WARDLEY IS NOT CONDITIONAL UPON COLLECTION 
FROM A THIRD PARTY 
Nothing in the employment contract that Young had with Wardley expressly provides 
that Young's right to be paid her commission is conditioned upon the payment of the 
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commissions by a third party, in this case the seller of the Chateau Brickyard Apartments. 
In addition to her relationship to Wardley as its agent, Young and Wardley had an 
employer/employee relationship. The only thing that was expressly contingent or conditional 
about Young being paid her real estate commissions under the employment contract with 
Wardley was her performance. She fully performed her duty to Wardley. Wardley did not 
fully perform on its duty to Young. 
Young was not a guarantor of the performance of the buyer or seller, nor was she a 
guarantor of the performance of Wardley as the principal broker. Under Utah law, Young 
could not pursue the seller, buyer or escrow agent to recover her commission. She could only 
pursue her principal broker. (UCA 62-2-18) Wardley, as her broker and as the principal 
broker, did nothing to safeguard the sales proceeds in escrow sufficient enough to pay those 
commissions and did not take reasonable and adequate steps to collect them after dispersal 
of the sales proceeds. This was Wardley's own voluntary decision. That fact does not 
excuse Wardley from liability to pay Young her share of the full commissions earned. 
D* THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS LEFT TO BE TRIED 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUES OF WARDLEY'S FAILURE TO PAY 
YOUNG HER COMMISSIONS 
In denying Young's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court noted there 
were questions about whether she had been paid her real estate commissions, if so how much 
had been paid and whether another agent was entitled to a share of the commissions, all of 
which warranted the denial of her motion. There are also disputes of material facts as to 
whether Wardley should have paid Young her share of the full real estate commission earned 
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and whether Wardley conducted itself in good faith and fairly attempted to preserve the 
commissions while the sales proceeds were in escrow at closing and whether Wardley took 
reasonable steps and diligently pursued collection of the full amount of the commissions after 
the proceeds were dispersed. The evidentiary answers to these questions will determine 
whether Wardley has breached its contractual duty to Young and whether it has also breached 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to Young. The case should be 
remanded to examine the evidence of these disputed issues of fact. 
E. AS CONSTRUED BY THE TRIAL COURT THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
IS AMBIGUOUS. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
Young contends that the trial judge erred in construing the provisions of the 
employment contract betweenher and Wardley by concluding that the contract defined earned 
commissions as those actually paid to Wardley by the seller. A contract is ambiguous if there 
are two or more plausible constructions. If the construction given the contract by the trial 
judge is plausible, the contract is ambiguous. In that event the case should be remanded to 
the trial court to take extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties at the time they entered 
into the contract. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment shall only be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah Rules of civil Procedure 56(c). Evidence in opposition to the motion 
12 
must reasonably support a finding in their favor on a material issue of fact. Billings v. Union 
Bankers Ins. Co., 819p2d803 (Utah 1991). Summaryjudgment is appropriate when it clearly 
appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail. 
Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P2d 64 (Utah 1984). 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment on appeal, the appellate court views all 
evidence presented by pleadings, affidavits and depositions, if any, together with all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the opposing party. 
The court reviews legal conclusions for correctness affording the trial court no discretion. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 
(Utah App 1993); Gate City Federal Savings And Loan Association v. Dalton, 808 P.2d 1117, 
157Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1991).Madison v. Deseret Land and Livestock, 574F.2d 
1027 (10* Cir. 1978). 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
In the final analysis, the trial court below determined that the issue of whether Young 
was entitled to a commission on the $ 166,000 unpaid portion of the commission that the seller 
did not pay Wardley as a matter of law by interpreting the terms of the employment 
agreement between the parties. The honorable Judge ruled that the provision in % 8 of the 
contract which states: "Division and distribution of earned commissions shall take place as 
soon as practical after collection of such commissions from the party or parties for whom the 
services have been performed.5' was definitive. The Court ruled that the contract as a whole 
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was clear and unambiguous and that the " term 'earned' indicates that Ms. Young's 
commission calculation is based upon the actual amount that the property yielded and not on 
an assumed amount." (AR 800) In other words, under the Judge's interpretation, the "earned 
commission was not to be determined by the agreed upon sales commission rate of 4 % of 
the sales price of the property as contracted in the Listing Agreement.. 
The Judge's construction overlooks the fact that the provision quoted from % 8 is a 
provision that provided when the commission is to be paid and not how much Young is to 
receive. The subject of that sentence is the time of the division of commissions, not the 
amount that is collected. The clear purpose of that sentence is to provide that the division 
of commissions take place "as soon as is practical" after the commission is paid to the broker. 
In its context it is not intended to provide that the amount of the commission earned is only 
the amount that is collected. The words "earned commission" and " as soon as practical after 
collection" are merely used to express the time the "earned commissions" are to be divided 
between Wardley and Young and not to limit the amount of the commissions earned to the 
amount that is collected. 
The amount of the commission earned is a matter of contract and in this case it is clear 
that rate was 4% of the purchase price of $7,900,000.00 which is $316,000.00. The amount 
of the commission "earned" by Young was her percentage of the $316,000, regardless of the 
amount collected.. See Robert Langston, LTD., v. L. Gurr McQuarrie 741 P.2d 554 (Utah 
1987). Also, Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2, 746, 751 (Utah 1983). The 
commission is not earned when the commission is paid or collected., but upon the procuring 
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of a buyer who is ready, willing and able and who is acceptable to the seller. (Id.) 
The same reasoning applies in the construction of the provision defining "In House 
Commission" on page 4 of the contract. The honorable Trial Judge ruled that the expression, 
"receive the percentage shown of the total commission received by the broker" further 
indicates that the agent's ("Sales Executive") earned commission is only the percentage of the 
total commission received by the broker. Again, the expression quoted is only used to 
illustrate the percentage of the commission which the sales agent is to receive. Those words 
were used to show how the total commission is to be divided, not to limit the amount of the 
commission earned on the sale to that which is actually received by the broker. 
In this case the earned amount of the commission included the amount not paid and 
for which Wardley sued the seller and obtained a default judgment. (Wardley Aff. AR 153, 
1f 16 & 17, Exhibit J, AR 185-188) Otherwise, Wardley's case against the seller would have 
been without merit.(Id.) 
There is simply no clause or provision in the employment agreement between Wardley 
and Young which is designed for the purpose of defining or limiting the amount of 
commissions earned to the amount received by Wardley. The amount of the earned 
commissions is derived from other contractual documents, in this case from the Single 
Agency Listing Agreement. The Honorable Judge erred in her construction of the 
employment contract. 
The issues in this case do not turn solely on the how much of the commission was 
paid, but also the lack of diligence of the broker in failing to safeguard and collect the 
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commission. The grant of summary judgment should be overturned and remanded back to 
the district court for an evidentiary determination of the latter issue. 
Young's position is supported by other cases in Utah and at least one other state. In 
Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292, 2004 UT 54 
(Ut. App. 2003)RobertLangston, LTD., v. L GurrMcQuarrie 741 P.2d at 558 n.7, (refusing 
to condition commission on parties' performance where contract did not contain conditional 
language); and, Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983) (refusing to 
adopt minority rule, which conditions commission on parties' performance if contract does 
not expressly condition liability for commission); The Utah Court of Appeals held in the 
Fairbourn case that the real estate broker, "by procuring and presenting to real estate 
developer an offer to buy developer's real property, performed its contractual duties under 
terms of listing agreement, and was thus deserving of commission..." The listing agreement 
in Fairbourn provided that the commission was due and payable at closing. In that case the 
closing never took place and the defendant argued that the broker was not entitled to a 
commission under the contract. The Court in Fairbourn held that the expression or term in 
the Listing Agreement, "due and payable at closing", only fixed the time of payment of the 
commission and not whether the broker was entitled to, or had earned a commission. 
In the Langston case, supra, the plaintiff real estate broker brought a buyer to the seller 
of cattle and range land grazing permits. After the parties entered into an agreement, and 
partially performed, a dispute arose between the parties which resulted in the trial court 
ordering a recission of the contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's recission 
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of the contract, but reversed the ruling below on the real estate commission. The Court held 
that the real estate broker was entitled to his commission even though the contract between 
the parties fell apart and was rescinded, because the realtor provided the seller with a ready 
willing and able buyer. 
In the Bushnell case, supra, p. 13, the seller failed to pay the balance due on the real 
estate commission when the buyer stopped making payments on a real estate purchase 
contract. The Supreme Court of Utah held that the realtor had earned his commission when 
he provided a ready, willing and able buyer acceptable to the seller and was not a guarantor 
of full payment by the buyer. 
While the broker is the party recovering in the above cited cases, the relationship of 
Young as agent to Wardley as broker is similar, if not identical, to the relationship between 
the realtor and the person obligated to pay the fee. This is because under Utah law an agent 
cannot bring an action to collect a real estate commission against the seller or other person. 
The agent can only pursue their principal broker on the transaction. UCA § 62-2 18 (1953 
as amended) 
B. WARDLEY OWED A CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO SAFEGUARD 
AND TAKE ALL REASONABLE STEPS TO COLLECT AND 
PAY YOUNG HER SHARE OF THE FULL COMMISSIONS 
During the times relevant to the sale of the Chateau Apartments for the seller, Young's 
relationship to Wardley was that of an employee to an employer. Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 1017, 458 Utah Adv, Rep. 15 (Utah 2002), (holding that 
in Utah the relationship between a real estate agent and its broker is that of employer and 
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employee). See also White v. Fox, 665 P. 2d 1297, 1301, (Utah 1983); Phillips v. JCMDev. 
Corp., 666 P.2d 876 881 (Utah 1983). Thus, while the Agency Agreement uses the 
description of independent contractor in two of its paragraphs, 1 and 15, the relationship of 
Wardley to plaintiff was that of her employer as a matter of law. The payment of an 
employee, by their employer for their labor and services, is normally dependent only upon 
the employee performing or completing the work which they're hired to do. Once the 
employee has performed or completed the work, the employer is obligated to pay them as 
agreed. 
Wardley earned and was entitled to a 4% commission ($316,000.00) on the sales price 
of $7,900,000.00. Thus, as an employee, plaintiff earned a commission on her share of the 
$316,000.00 to be paid her by Wardley. The Employment Agreement obligates Wardley to 
pay plaintiff her share of the $316,000.00 commissions, which the Listing Agreement, 
together with the Employment Agreement, provided and which plaintiff earned at the time she 
provided Seller with a ready, willing, and able Buyer. 
C. YOUNG'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH WARDLEY IS 
NOT CONDITIONAL UPON COLLECTION OF THE COMMISSION. 
There is no express condition or contingency in Young's employment contract with 
Wardley to her being paid her real estate commission, except Young's performance. Young 
performed splendidly in representing Wardley in connection with both sides or legs of the 
transaction, both the sale and purchase. Yet, Wardley has repudiated its obligation to the 
plaintiff by refusing to pay her the full share of her earned commission. Wardley attempted 
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to escape its obligation to pay plaintiff her earned commission by rationalizing in previous 
pleadings before the trial court that, "the seller breached its agreement by failing to pay 
Wardley its 4%" ; "Wardley acquired a default judgment against the seller in two states and 
found the seller to be insolvent3"; "Wardley has the right (under the contract) to refuse to 
make any effort to collect commission"; and, "Wardley has the sole discretion to collect 
commissions owed to it by third parties". 
Wardley has made these arguments as though it is relieved of its obligation to pay 
plaintiff her earned commission. However, Young fully performed and met her obligations 
under the employment agreement. Wardley failed to perform and complete its duty. Young's 
right to be paid was not contingent upon the seller's payment of the obligation to Wardley, 
it was only conditioned upon her bringing a ready, willing and able buyer who was acceptable 
to the seller. Thompson's employment agreement with Wardley was not a "conditional 
contract". Fairbourn Commercial, Inc., v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 68 P.3d 1038 
(Utah App. 2003); RobertLangston, LTD., v. L. GurrMcQuarrie 741 P.2d at 558 n.7, supra, 
p. 6, (refusing to condition the commission on the parties' performance where contract did 
not contain conditional language); and, Fairbourn Commercial, Inc., v. American Housing 
Partners, Inc., 68 P.3d 1038 (Utah App. 2003), supra, p. 6, (refusing to adopt minority rule, 
3
 Wardley's statement in pervious pleadings that it acquired a judgment in two states is a 
little euphemistic. It obtained a judgment by default in Utah by doing no more than having its 
attorney file a complaint and take a default when the seller did not answer. It then registered the 
judgment in California, the second state, and then had an asset search performed. It did nothing 
more after it learned of the financial condition of the seller from the asset search. 
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which conditions commission on a party's performance if the contract does not expressly 
condition liability for commission the party's performance) 
kiBushnell, supra p. 13, the Court stated that "absent a contractual provision, which 
conditions the right to a commission on the performance of the buyer, the general rule 
accepted in Utah is that a broker has earned his commission upon the procuring of a buyer 
who is ready, willing and able and who is accepted by the seller. The broker is not an insurer 
of the subsequent performance of the contract and is not deprived of his right to a commission 
by the failure or refusal of the buyer to perform." (citation omitted) Young should not be 
held to be an insurer of the collection of the commission by Wardley. 
Similarly, in Fairbourn, the Utah Court of Appeals considered the claims by a real 
estate broker against a real estate developer to recover sales commission from the sale of real 
property. The Court affirmed judgment in favor of the real estate broker and held that the real 
estate broker, "by procuring and presenting to real estate developer an offer to buy 
developer's real property, performed its contractual duties under terms of listing agreement 
and was thus deserving of its commission..." In this case, the Employment Agreement 
provides in paragraph 8 that commissions shall be those set forth in the "Annual Graduated 
Schedule For Realtors" which is on page 4 of the Agreement following the signatures of the 
parties to the contract. Paragraph 8 also states that, "earned commission will be paid as soon 
as practical after collection". This provision provides when the commission will be paid, not 
whether or not it will be paid. The "In House Commission" definition on page 4 merely 
describes how the commissions will be apportioned. Taken together, those provisions do not 
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provide that the portion that is received is all that the agent will receive, but when it is paid 
and how what is paid at a given time will be apportioned. Nothing in paragraph 8, or the 
"Annual Graduated Schedule For Realtors", provides or states that Thompson's commission 
is conditional and will be paid only, unless, until, or if, collected. Fairbourn and Bushnell, 
supra. Thompson's employment contract with Wardley does not contain language that 
conditions her right to a commission on the collection of a commission from a third party. 
Plaintiff has found no Utah real estate cases directly in point. The Michigan Court of 
Appeals, in a very similar case, construed a provision similar to that of paragraph 8 of 
plaintiff's employment agreement with Wardley. That contract provided, "to pay the 
salesman a commission in accordance with the rate schedule below, immediately after 
consummation of any sale as soon as such commission has been collected by the broker." In 
construing that provision the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that: 
"While this provision specifies the time when a broker is required to pay an earned 
commission to a salesman, we do not construe it to allow the broker to deny recovery 
of a commission that has been earned by a salesman under his employment contract. 
Where, as here, the broker either by choice fails to collect his commission or, through 
his own fault accepts a listing agreement contrary to the employment contract, the 
salesman is not denied the right to recover his commission." Abraham v. Neller, 
172 N.S. 2d 817, 819 (Michigan App. Div. 2, 1969) 
While the Michigan case is not controlling or authoritative for Utah courts it is persuasive and 
very much on point. 
Where provisions of the agency contract (Employment Agreement here) are 
construed to specify only the time when compensation is to be paid to the agent, 
the principal is not entitled to deny a recovery of commissions by either failing to 
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collect the sum owed him or her by the customer or by accepting a listing agreement 
for the property, which is the subject matter of the agency, under which the principal 
loses the right to demand such payment. 24 C.IS. Agency § 315 
While Wardley may argue that it did not lose its right to demand payment in this case, 
it either voluntarily or negligently allowed the seller and the buyer to trample on that right and 
did not exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to enforce it. The effect is the same. 
In Reed v. Union Cent Life Ins. 61 P. 21 (Utah 1900), the court considered claims by 
a sales agent against his principal, an insurance company, for earned commissions. The court 
held that "the defendant company having placed beyond its power the right to collect certain 
premium notes in which plaintiff had an interest, as for commission, was estopped from 
denying liability for commission earned upon the ground that the maker of the notes was 
insolvent and the notes uncollectible. The court held that "a principal who agrees that his 
agent shall receive a percentage of money or commissions to be paid upon a contract secured 
through such agent, for the benefit of both, cannot dispose of his own right to receive the fund, 
and thus deprive the agent of the rewards for his service. Otherwise, the principal might 
receive a full equivalent for the original fruits of the agent's labor, and yet not pay him a 
dollar. The principal cannot do this without the agent's express consent..." Also see Sterling 
B. Cannon v. Stevens School of Business. Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977) (a person cannot 
avoid liability for the non-performance of its obligation by placing such performance beyond 
his control by his own voluntary act.) 
In the present case, Young's employment agreement has no express contractual 
provision which conditions her right to a commission from Wardley on the performance or part 
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performance of another party. Just as a broker is not an insurer of the performance of a buyer 
or another third party, she is not an insurer of the subsequent performance of the Seller or, for 
that matter, of the broker, Wardley. She is not deprived of her right to her full share of 
commission from Wardley by the failure or refusal of the Seller, or anyone else, to perform 
and is not deprived of her right to her commission because of Wardley's failure to collect the 
full commission. She is entitled to have Wardley pay her share of the entire $316,000.00 
commission which she earned. Further, on the one hand, Young provided Wardley and the 
buyer and seller with valuable and quahty service. She prepared and delivered all required 
documents to both parties and did everything she could to facilitate the consummation of the 
purchase and sale. 
On the other hand, the evidence shows that Wardley did practically nothing but sit by 
and watch the seller and the buyer spirit away $ 166,000 and divide it between themselves with 
impunity. It appears from the evidence that Wardley did not demand that the escrow agent 
hold out from distribution, sufficient funds to cover the full commission or demand that the 
escrow officer inter- plead the funds, or even attempt to obtain a restraining order to freeze the 
funds in the account pending resolution of any claim. 
Moreover, after the funds were dispersed, Wardley only brought suit against the seller 
and obtained a default judgment that cannot be collected, notwithstanding it had been advised 
by two different experienced attorney's, from two reputable law firms, that it had good causes 
of action against the buyer and the escrow agent. (Young Aff, AR 624-626 and relevant 
exhibits attached thereto). It declined to bring suit against the buyer who was in collusion with 
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the seller in cutting the amount of the commission to $150,000, less than one half of the total 
amount due. 
Young averred in her affidavit that she heard the buyer on the telephone tell the seller 
at the closing, they could take money out of "Cindy" s commission. The buyer well knew that 
Wardley had a listing contract with the seller. It was a clear case of interference with 
contractual relations.(Young Aff. AR 626) Wardley, who touts the fact that it sued the seller 
and obtained a default judgment, refused to sue the buyer, who was in collusion with the seller 
in changing Wardley's commission and who was now in possession of the same real property 
which he purchased from the seller in the transaction. (Young Aff. Exhibits D, E & F, AR 627-
646) 
Also, Wardley refused to sue the escrow agent who had a fiduciary duty to hold the 
commission is escrow for Wardley because it had a friendly business relationship with 
Associated Title Company who handled the closing. (Young Aff. AR 626627 and Above cited 
Exhibits) 
D. THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS 
LEFT TO BE TRIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUES OF 
WARDLEY'S FAILURE TO PAY YOUNG HER COMMISSIONS 
In denying Young's motion for summary judgment the trial court noted there were 
disputed issues of fact concerning the claims of Young to a share of the commissions. It is 
also clear from the foregoing that there are disputed issues of fact about whether Wardley had 
paid Young and whether Young was entitled to all of the agent's commission on the sale. 
There are also substantial questions and disputes of fact, over what Wardley did at the time 
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of closing, and after, and whether Wardley discharged or breached its contractual duty to 
Young. There are also facts which came out at trial that support Young's position that 
Wardley owed her an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Young's complaint for breach of contract and for 
breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. When all of the affidavits, pleadings 
and depositions submitted by Wardley in support and by Young in opposition are considered 
in a light most favorable to Young, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, there are disputed issues of fact and Wardley is not entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. The grants of summary judgment of both of the trial court's orders should be reversed 
and the case remanded to the district court for the taking of evidence at trial or other 
appropriate evidentiary hearing. 
E. AS CONSTRUED BY THE TRIAL COURT THE EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS- THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED 
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
A contract is ambiguous when it may be given two plausible interpretations. Fairhourn 
Commercial Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292, 2004 UT 54 Young 
contends that the contract is not ambiguous, but that the trial judge simply erred in construing 
it. However, if this Court finds that the construction of the trial court is plausible, the contract 
is ambiguous and should be remanded to the trial court for the taking of extrinsic evidence of 
the intentions of the parties in entering into the contract. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utahl995) Fairhourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing 
Partners, Inc., Supra. In the Intermountain Farmers Association case, the Utah Supreme 
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Court applied in Utah, for the first time, the rule that where a contract is ambiguous the trial 
court must consider extrinsic evidence ("any credible evidence") of the intent of the parties in 
entering in to the contract. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The trial court below erred in construing the employment contract between Wardley and 
Young to limit Young's earned real estate commission to her share of the commission actually 
paid by the seller and not the amount of the commission to which she was entitled under the 
listing agreement for procuring a ready, willing and able buyer, who was acceptable to the 
seller. The court below erred in concluding as a matter of law that Young could not recover 
her share of the unpaid commission from Wardley. 
Young fully performed under the employment contract. Wardley failed to perform by 
failing to discharge its duty to collect the commission at closing or recover it after closing. 
There are disputes as to substantial and material issues of fact. When all of the evidence 
presented in favor and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, together with all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, is viewed in a light most favorable to Young, 
Wardley is not entitled to summary judgment. 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court granting Wardley Summary 
Judgment below in all respects and remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
)elano S. Findlay Attorney for l^ lfintiff/Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
1. STATUTES: 
Utah Code Annotated § 62-2-18. Actions for recovery of compensation restricted 
(1) No persona may bring or maintain an action in any court of this state for 
the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered which is prohibited this chapter to other than licensed principal brokers, 
unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker at the time of doing the 
act or rendering the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the 
recovery If a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or 
associate broker unless the action is against the principal broker with whom he is 
licensed. Any action for recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation 
may only be commenced and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales 
agent or associate broker is affiliated. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
2. RULES AND REGULATIONS: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56 (copy attached) 
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